Why do some firms adopt environmental management practices that go beyond regulatory compliance while other firms decide to comply to regulations? This paper leverages institutional theory by proposing that firms respond to the pressure of institutional actors such as politicians, regulators, customers, competitors, and local communities. However, the way in which plants perceive and act upon these pressures depends upon plant-and parent company-specific factors, including their track record of environmental performance, the competitive position of the parent company and the organizational structure of the plant.
INTRODUCTION
Why do some firms adopt environmental management practices that go beyond regulatory compliance? Is the adoption of these practices driven by potential performance outcomes or by institutional pressures? Several articles have reported the findings of surveys that have asked firms what motivated them to adopt environmental practices (e.g., Lawrence & Morell, 1995; Florida & Davison, 2001b , 2001a . For example, Lawrence & Morell (1995) found that environmentally proactive firms were motivated by regulations, reducing costs, avoiding being targeted by environmental non-governmental organizations, and critical events. Florida & Davidson (2001a,b) identified many factors that have motivated some facilities to adopt environmental management systems (EMSs) and pollution prevention activities. However, these articles did not analyze why some firms implemented proactive rather than reactive environmental strategies. For example, why do some firms adopt end-of-pipe technologies while other engage in pollution prevention activities? Why do some firms just comply with regulation while other go beyond compliance by participating in voluntary programs? As others recently pointed out, "our understanding of factors that foster strong environmental management practices within a firm, particularly with operations at the plant level, still remains limited" (Klassen, 2001: 257) .
Some research has analyzed specific drivers to the adoption of environmental strategies such as competitive drivers (Dean & Brown, 1995; Hart, 1995; Nehrt, 1996; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Aragón-Correa, 1998; Nehrt, 1998; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Christmann, 2000) , the influence of organizational context and design (Sharma, Pablo & Vredenburg, 1999; Ramus & Steger, 2000; Sharma, 2000) , and organizational learning (Marcus & Nichols, 1999) . Other analyses have focused on the individual or managerial level, examining the role of leadership values (Egri & Herman, 2000) , environmental champions (Andersson & Bateman, 2000) , managerial attitudes (Cordano & Frieze, 2000) , managerial interpretations of environmental issues as threats or opportunities Sharma, 2000) , and managerial risk propensity (Sharma & Nguan, 1999) . While each has provided a piece of the puzzle, we propose a more comprehensive perspective that evaluates the relative influences of external stakeholders exerting institutional pressures while examining the extent to which these pressures are moderated by firm and industry factors.
Two theories provide insights on why firms adopt environmental management practices. The economic approach describes firms' adoption behavior as driven by performance outcomes. This line of research seeks to identify the circumstances when it pays to be "green" and that managers exhibit rational behavior when they adopt "beyond compliance" practices (Konar & Cohen, 1997; Russo & Fouts, 1997; King & Lenox, 2001) . A second line of research, rooted in institutional sociology, proposes that firms respond to institutional pressures. The institutional sociology framework emphasizes the importance of regulatory, normative and cognitive factors that affect firms' decisions to adopt a specific organization practice, above and beyond the technical efficiency of the practice. Institutional theory places particular emphasis on legitimation processes and the tendency for institutionalized organizational structures and procedures to be taken for granted, regardless of their efficiency implications (Hoffman & Ventresca, 2002) .
In this paper, we argue that the reasons why companies adopt various environmental management practices depend both on firm-specific internal factors as well as the institutional pressures that are exerted on them by external stakeholders. In our model, firms may be subject to the same level of institutional pressures but perceive this pressure differently according to their organizational structure, strategic position, and financial and environmental performance. This difference between "objective" and "perceived" pressure leads to different choices of responses. The adoption of environmental management practices by firms varies therefore according to the process that transforms objective pressures into perceived pressures.
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Institutional theory is concerned with the influence of external forces on organizational decisionmaking. Institutional theory emphasizes the role of social and cultural pressures imposed on organizations that influence organizational practices and structures (Scott, 1992) . DiMaggio & Powell (1983) argue that managerial decisions are strongly influenced by three institutional mechanisms-coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism-that create and diffuse a common set of values, norms, and rules to produce similar practices and structures across organizations that share a common organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 ). An organizational field is defined as "those organizations that…constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products. The virtue of this unit of analysis is that it directs our attention…to the totality of relevant actors" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148) . Jennings & Zandbergen (1995) were amongst the first to apply institutional theory to explain firms' adoption of environmental management practices. They argue that because coercive forces-primarily in the form of regulations and regulatory enforcement-have been the main impetus of environmental management practices, firms throughout each industry have implemented similar practices (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995 : 1031 . Consistent with most institutional theorists, Jennings & Zandbergen argue that firms that share the same organization field are affected in similar ways by institutional forces that emanate from them. They cite the examples of how the Three Mile Island crisis undermined the legitimacy of all firms in the US nuclear power industry, and how the discovery that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) depleted stratospheric ozone undermined the legitimacy of manufacturing and using those products and soon led to institutional coercive forces via the establishment of the Montreal Protocol to phase out the manufacture of CFCs.
Other researchers have explored how companies operating in different organizational fields are subject to different institutional pressures. As a result, different practices become commonplace.
For example, Milstein, Hart & York (2002) argue that distinct levels of coercive pressures are exerted upon different industries, which has led to different environmental strategies (Milstein, Hart & York, 2002) . Oliver (1991) notes that institutionalized norms and practices can erode "when organizational constituents become more geographically dispersed, non-interacting, or autonomous" (Oliver, 1991: 577) , such as when firms enter new markets or diversify into new products.
While such studies examine dynamic and cross-industry institutional forces, they avoid the question more fundamental to strategic management: why do organizations within the same organizational field pursue different strategies, despite institutional isomorphic pressures? In other words, how might institutional forces lead to heterogeneity, rather than homogeneity, within an industry? Hoffman (2001) argues that organizational action neither is a strict reaction to the pressures dictated by the field, nor is defined autonomously without the influence of external bounds. Institutional and organizational dynamics are tightly linked (Hoffman, 2001 Levy & Rothenberg, 2002) . Levy & Rothenberg (2002) describe several mechanisms by which institutionalism can encourage heterogeneity. First, they argue that institutional forces are transformed as they permeate organizational boundaries because they are filtered and interpreted by managers according to firms' organizational unique history and culture. For example, "a firm's history with environmental technology influenced the degree to which future technological options were viewed as an opportunity or a threat" (Levy & Rothenberg, 2002) . Second, they describe how an institutional field may contain conflicting institutional pressures that require prioritization by managers. Third, they describe how multinational and diversified organizations operate within several institutional fields-both at the societal and organizational levels-which expose them to different sets of institutionalized practices and norms.
D 'Aunno et al. (2000) explore the circumstances under which organizations are more likely to abandon institutionalized structures or practices in favor of new ones, such as by diversifying into new services. They find that market forces (proximity to competitors), institutional forces (poor compliance with government regulations, being a member of a multidivisional firm), and mimicry of similar changes observed in other organizational fields each encourage strategic change that diverges from institutional norms.
Our hypothesis is that firm organizational structure, strategic positioning, and performance will affect how the firm perceives institutional pressures and how it decides to respond (Prakash, 2000; Hoffman, 2001) . Individuals in organizations focus on different aspects of the firm's external and internal environments, depending on the cognitive frame through which they look at the world. Cognitive frames are mental representations of a particular aspect of the world that are used by individuals to interpret and make sense of their world. Frames can come to be collectively held within organizations, especially through the influence of the organizational leader.
In the next section we describe the pressures that firms are subject to and formulate our hypotheses.
INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES
Institutional sociology adopts a broad notion of the institutional environment, which includes the "cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social activities" (Scott, 1995:33) . The institutional sociology framework emphasizes the importance of regulatory, normative and cognitive factors that affect firms' decisions to adopt a specific organization practice beyond the technical efficiency of the practice. The regulatory pillar has been the most studied in the literature on environmental management. In this context, firms are responding to the coercive action of regulators or activists. Failing to respond to these pressures engenders significant risk to a firm's legitimacy and viability. The normative pillar of the institutional environment refers to sets of expectations, within particular organizational contexts, of what constitutes appropriate and legitimate behavior (Scott, 1995) . In other words, Scott's normative pillar is grounded in what is viewed as appropriate for, or what is expected of, organizations. Much of the writing on normative constraints emphasizes how the normative expectations assume a taken-for-granted form; the ways of organizing become unquestioned, and alternatives become unthinkable (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983 ). The cognitive aspects of the institutional environment refer to the cultural elements that govern choice often without receiving conscious thought (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999) . The normative and cognitive elements of the institutional environment have an important impact on the adoption of organizational practice as they frame, and thus limit, the set of envisioned pressures and organizational alternatives. An otherwise attractive organizational alternative may be dismissed out of hand, because it is not perceived as appropriate within a particular institutional context.
The remainder of this section describes a model that links institutional pressures to organizational characteristics to explain the adoption of environmental management practices at the plant level. Figure 1 illustrates our model. It shows that a firm's perceptions of institutional pressures are a function of stakeholders' actions but are moderated by the firm's own organizational characteristics and strategic positioning as well as the attributes of the potential environmental management practice. Our approach complements institutional theory as it shows the diversity of both the institutions driving environmental pressures including external and internal pressures to the organization and the corresponding organizational responses developed within each company. We describe how these coercive and normative pressures can impact the adoption of environmental management practices by firms. We focus on a subset of Hoffman's (2001) nine institutional actors whom we believe are most likely to directly influence environmental practices at the facility level: politicians, regulators, customers, competitors, and local communities. Our list corresponds to those stakeholder groups that are viewed as important to consider when assessing a firm's environmental performance (Lober, 1996) .
Political and regulatory pressure
Perhaps the most obvious stakeholders that influence firms' adoption of environmental practices are various government bodies, which are authorized to exercise coercive power. Legislation authorizes agencies to promulgate and enforce regulations. Many researchers have focused on the influence of enforced extant legislation and regulations on firms' environmental practices (Carraro, Katsoulacos & Xepapadeas, 1996; Majumdar and Marcus, 2001; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998) . By political pressure, we refer to the level of political support for more stringent regulations. Regulatory pressure refers to the extent to which regulators threaten to or actually impede a company's operations.
Customer and competitive pressure
In addition to government actors, firms may exert coercive and mimetic isomorphism. For example, multinationals are widely recognized as key agents in the diffusion of practices across national borders by transmitting organizational techniques to subsidiaries and to other organizations in the host country (Arias & Guillen, 1998) . Firms may mimic the practices that successful leading firms have adopted. In addition, firms respond to customer requirements. The customer-supplier relationship is perhaps the primary mechanism through which quality management standards have diffused. Several studies have found that firms that have adopted environmental management practices are motivated by customer concerns. For example, customers have influenced companies' decision to adopt an environmental plan (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996) . Customers in developed countries have influenced companies in China to improve their environmental compliance and adopt the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System standard (Christmann & Taylor, 2001) . Companies with retail customers had more comprehensive EMS's, suggesting that retail consumers exert more pressure on companies to adopt environmental management practices than do other types of customers .
Community pressure
Local communities can also impose coercive pressure on companies through their vote in local and national elections, through their environmental activism within environmental nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and through citizen lawsuits. Several studies have found that company decisions to adopt environmental management practices are influenced by the desire to improve or maintain relations with their communities. In a 1993 survey of 200 corporate general counsel, over half indicated that "pressure from community activists had affected their companies' conduct -sometimes forcing a reduction in pollution" (Lavelle, 1993 ). An empirical study found that companies' decision to adopt an environmental plan was positively influenced by community group pressure (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1996) . 1 Florida & Davison (2001a) investigated why facilities had adopted EMS's and instituted pollution prevention programs. They found that enhancing community relations was a driver for 85% of those facilities that had adopted both an EMS and pollution prevention program (Florida & Davison, 2001a) . In addition, a much higher proportion of these facilities reported sharing information with neighbors and environmental groups, meeting with community leaders, participating in community meetings, and involving neighbors and community groups in their environmental initiatives, compared to those facilities that had not adopted an EMS or implemented a pollution prevention program. In other words, the adoption of EMS and pollution prevention programs was correlated with actively engaging community stakeholders. Another study based on a survey of 130 ISO 14001 certified companies across 15 countries showed that one of the strongest motivating factors to pursue certification was the desire to be a good neighbor (Raines, 2002) . Some communities may be better able than others to encourage facilities to adopt environmental practices. Communities with larger minority populations, lower incomes, and less education have greater exposure to both criteria pollutants 2 and toxic emissions (Brooks & Sethi, 1997; Arora & Cason, 1999; Khanna & Vidovic, 2001 ).
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Greater declines in toxic emissions have been observed among facilities located in communities with higher voting rates (Hamilton, 1999) and in states with higher membership in environmental interest groups (Maxwell, Lyon & Hackett, 2000) . Hamilton (1999) asserts that voting rates are a proxy for the propensity of residents to pursue collective action. Toxic emission exposures declined in communities with falling proportions of minorities and growing proportions of voter turnout in presidential elections (Brooks & Sethi, 1997) . Maxwell et al. (2000) assert that higher environmental interest group membership levels indicate a community's pro-environmental stance and greater propensity to use these organizations to lobby for more stringent regulation. As such, they conclude that higher membership rates provide a credible threat of increased regulation, which in turn drives firms to self-regulate.
Some researchers have begun examining whether socioeconomic community characteristics are 2 Criteria pollutants are regulated by the US Clean Air Act and include ozone, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and lead. associated with facilities' decision to adopt environmental management practices. One study examined facility-level adoption of an EPA voluntary program, and found that adoption was more likely in communities with higher median household income (Khanna & Vidovic, 2001 ).
Many of the firms studied by Lawrence & Morell (1995) , especially the larger ones, were motivated to improve their environmental performance by their concern over "environmental organizations that had aggressively publicized firms' lapses in environmental responsibility" (Lawrence & Morell, 1995: 111) . There are many examples where companies have amended their environmental practices in response to environmental group pressures. For instance, after Mitsubishi Corporation was subject to a protracted consumer boycott led by Rainforest Action Network (RAN), the parties announced an agreement that Mitsubishi end use of old-growth forest products (World Rainforest Movement, 1998) . After a grassroots campaign that included hundreds of demonstrations, thousands of postcards and phone calls to Staples corporate headquarters and regional offices, local and national media attention, and a shareholder's resolution, a coalition of environmental groups persuaded the company to cease buying paper products from endangered forests and to increase sales of recycled products (Lazaroff, 2002) .
The moderating effects of industry characteristics
The way the industry is organized within an institutional context may also affect the rate of diffusion of environmental management practices. If an industry is dominated by a few big players that require their suppliers to adopt particular environmental management practices, this is likely to lead to a greater diffusion of these practices than if the industry were more fragmented. This may explain the particularly high adoption of common quality and environmental practices in the US automotive supply industry.
Institutional researchers have also argued that organizations are more likely to mimic the behavior of other organizations that are tied to them through networks (Guler, Guillen & MacPherson, 2002) . Several studies have found that industry associations have motivated firms to adopt environmental management practices. Kollman & Prakash (2002) examine why the certification rates of EMS's differ so strikingly between firms in the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. They find that the decision of whether to pursue certification, and which standard to certify against (ISO 14001 or the European Union's Eco-Audit and Management Scheme) is strongly influenced by stakeholder pressures from industry associations in addition to regional chambers of commerce, suppliers, and regulators (Kollman & Prakash, 2002) .
The moderating effects of firm characteristics
Within the same industry, firms may be subjected to different levels of institutional pressures.
For example, multinational corporations are often held to higher standards for social and environmental responsibility than national companies because of "international reputation sideeffects and foreign stakeholder salience" (Zyglidopoulos, 2002) . Likewise, because leading firms are more visible, they may be subject to more pressure. For example, Nike, McDonald's, Starbucks, and Home Depot have been targeted by social and environmental activists partially due to their being market leaders. Furthermore, firms with historically poor environmental records are subjected to more scrutiny by their local communities and regulators. Thus, multinational companies, market leading branded firms, and firms with poor environmental records may have more to gain by developing sophisticated management of external pressures.
Firms that operate many facilities have more to gain by maintaining a reputation for good relations with governments and communities, since these firms are more likely to require approval from governments and communities to site additional facilities.
In addition, managers are subject to greater normative pressures when there is more uncertainty about the outcome of management practices that are being considered. Indeed, elements of the institutional environment are more likely to influence decisions of whether to implement management practices under conditions of uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) . This uncertainty could be driven by the novelty of a management practice or voluntary program, when its benefits and costs of implementation are yet indeterminate (Delmas, 2002) .
Interactions
The interaction of these institutional pressures is likely to moderate their influence on company inspections, and investigate accidents. INPO was created to prevent laggards from endangering the legitimacy of the entire US nuclear power industry (Gunningham & Sinclair, 2002: 100) and has subsequently played a significant role in improving the safety of nuclear power plant operations (Rees, 1994) .
PERCEPTION OF PRESSURE
Firm and facility characteristics can affect not only the level of institutional pressure that they are subject to but also how institutional pressures are perceived by a facility. This is important because, even if institutional pressures were exerted at the same level on two facilities, these two facilities would perceive and respond differently to these pressures due to organizational and strategic characteristics.
Even if firms were subject to the same level of pressure, this pressure would be perceived differently due to firm characteristics. First, institutional pressures are exerted at various levels of a firm. For example, community pressures are often directly targeted at a particular facility, which shareholder pressures target the corporate level. Second, organizations channel these institutional pressures to different subunits, each of which frames these pressures according to their typical functional routines (Hoffman, 2001 ). As such, legal departments interpret pressures in terms of risk and liability, public affairs does so in terms of company reputation, environmental affairs in terms of ecosystem damage and regulatory violations, and sales departments in terms of potential lost revenues. Consequently, the pressure is managed according to the cultural frame, either as an issue of regulatory compliance, human resource management, operational efficiency, risk management, market demand, or social responsibility (Hoffman, 2001) . One implication of this process is that the internal organization of the firm matters because it influences how institutional pressures are perceived. In particular, firms with open channels of communications between the immediate receptor of pressures (finance, law, strategy, communication, environment) and the facility-level environmental management may perceive more strongly these external pressures and respond to them accordingly.
Information sources may also play a role in cultural framing. Environmental managers may learn about management practices from a variety of sources. For example, a facility may learn in an industry association meeting about a pending boycott of a competitor because of its environmental performance. The source where managers get their information on environmental management practices can also influence their decision to adopt environmental management practices. Our survey will A firm's historical environmental performance may also influence both how it perceives stakeholder pressures and how it responds to them. Firms that have dealt with pollution accidents and whose reputations have suffered may be more sensitive to environmental issues than companies that did not face such event (Prakash, 2000) . After major accidents, firms may rearrange their organizational structure to prevent recurrences and to facilitate more rapid responses. Such reorganizations may also be motivated to engage proactively with stakeholders, , such as regulators and environmental activists, who can be expected to more closely monitor the firm's future activities. These reorganizations may also occur within competing firms if heighten institutional pressures spill beyond the firm that experienced the accident. For example, the disclosure of environmental information in the annual reports of oil companies increased significantly in the years following the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Patten, 1992) . Similarly, following the its chemical disaster in Bhopal, Union Carbide along with other large chemical companies developed and promoted the Responsible Care program to chemical industry associations in Canada and the US. This set of environment, health and safety (EHS) management practices was meant to relieve pressure for more stringent regulations that could adversely affect the entire chemical industry (Prakash, 2000) . Industry associations across Europe and Asia have subsequently adopted the program.
FIRM RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES
Firms can respond to these institutional pressures by adopting various environmental management practices (see Appendix A). Sharma distinguished between environmental strategies of conformance voluntary environmental strategies (Sharma, 2000) . Environmental strategies of conformance involve complying with regulations and adopting standard industry practices, while voluntary environmental strategies aim at reducing the environmental impact of operations, not to conform (Sharma, 2000) . Voluntary strategies involve creative problem solving and collaborative interactions with stakeholders (Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998) addresses environmental issues with various stakeholders (customers, community, activists) via ad hoc ongoing meetings, effective process to receive and respond to stakeholder concerns about environmental issues, procedure to identify key issues of concern to 4 "Some companies are starting to integrate performance requirements for responsible business practices into their management appraisal and incentive systems" (Nelson, 2002: 17) 5 "Leaders in corporate responsibility engage in systematic communication, consultation and collaboration with their key stakeholders. They host stakeholder forums and some establish permanent stakeholder advisory panels at either the corporate level, the plant level, or to address a specific issue. BT, Unilever, DuPont, Dow, and the Suez Group all offer examples of such advisory structures" (Nelson, 2002: 18) stakeholders. 
